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NSU BRIEFING

27 October 1954 📲 🐃

## COMMUNIST THREAT TO FORMOSA

- 1. US protection Formosa almost certainly largest factor in Communist inaction to date.
  - A. Since June '50 "neutralization",

    Perping has not repeated earlier

    "liberation" time-table.
  - B. Promises "liberation" intensified recently, but propaganda implies further preparations necessary.
- 11. Sino-Soviet communique (11 October)

  fails mention "liberation" Formosa:

  some speculation Pelping tried but

  failed get Soviet military commitment,
  - A. Believe partners agreed postpone attack pending outcome diplomacy.

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- B. Maneuvers would try force US
  withdrawal or at least, completely isolate US as Nationalist
  supporter.
- (11. By spring '55, Communists may be ready to try force.
  - A. Peiping expected use eight armies-400,000 troops--for assault. Now
    some 470,000 between Shanghai
    and Canton. Nationalists, in
    contrast, have about 285,000
    effectives.
  - B. Communist air already superior to Nationalists. By spring '55, probably 950 jet fighters, 175 jet bombers.
  - C. Communist navy now weak, but
    almost surely stronger by spring
    '55. Already have three subs:
    USSR may be transferring two more

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subs, two destroyers, two minesweepers at Tsingtao, other subs and small craft at Port Arthur. Light cruiser (Chungking) now at Dairen, may be operational by spring.

D. For water-lift, would still need use junks by thousands, which available.

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- v. On Nationalist side, some possibility dangerous actions, as worries over future accumulate.
  - A. Nationalist leaders declare "return to mainland" cannot be postponed indefinitely.
  - B. Might attempt "now or never"
    involvement US forces in major
    action with Communists, goad
    Communists with major raids,
    increased ship seizures, air
    attacks.
  - C. In other direction, Nationalists

    might despair of "return." Would

    then become vulnerable to Communist

    propaganda urging defection,

    offering amousty.
  - VI. Thus far, Nationalists seem all right-met detying US; not falling for
    Communist propaganda.